ABSTRACT For secure communication between any two neighboring sensing devices on the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, it is essential to design a secure device access control and key agreement protocol, in which the two phases, namely, ''node authentication'' and ''key agreement'' are involved. While the node authentication allows two sensing devices to authenticate each other using their own pre-loaded secret credentials in memory, the key agreement phase permits to establish a secret key between them if the mutual authentication is successful. In this paper, we propose a new certificate-based ''lightweight access control and key agreement protocol in the IoT environment, called LACKA-IoT,'' that utilizes the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) along with the ''collision-resistant one-way cryptographic hash function.'' Through a detailed security analysis using the formal security under the ''Real-Or-Random (ROR) model,'' informal (non-mathematical) security analysis, and formal security verification using the broadly used ''Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)'' tool, we show that the LACKA-IoT can protect various known attacks that are needed for a secure device access control mechanism in the IoT. Furthermore, through a comparative study of the LACKA-IoT and other relevant schemes, we show that there is a better tradeoff among the security and functionality features and communication and computational costs of the LACKA-IoT as compared to other schemes. Finally, the ''practical demonstration using the NS2 simulation'' has been carried out on the LACKA-IoT to measure various network parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of ''several things (devices) that are interconnected through the public Internet'' [1] . A thing or object could be either physical or virtual that can be assigned a unique identity, such as device ID or IP address. Examples of ''physical objects'' include
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kaiping Xue. ' 'smartphone, sensor, camera, drone, vehicle, and so on'', whereas ''virtual objects'' may be ''agenda, electronic ticket, book, wallet, and so on''. Most of the IoT devices are smart because these can send the data gathered from their surrounding environment and take actions without any human interventions.
Figure 1 [2] , [3] illustrates ''a generic IoT network architecture in which different scenarios (e.g., home, transport, community and national) are shown''. The smart devices, FIGURE 1. A generic IoT environment (Adapted from [2] , [3] ).
TABLE 1.
IoT endpoint spending by category (millions of dollars) [7] . such as ''sensors'' and ''actuators'' are placed in different applications. The IoT devices are then interconnected to the public Internet through the trusted Gateway Nodes (GWNs). Furthermore, in some applications, the access privilege of IoT smart devices can be given to different users (e.g., ''a smart home user in a home application'' [4] and ''a doctor in a healthcare application'' [5] ) [1] , [6] . Gartner Inc. [7] predicted that ''the number of connected IoT smart devices will reach 20.4 billion by the year 2020''. As the customers are anticipated to buy more IoT devices in the future, ''business investments are likely to increase in future years'' too. Table 1 tabulates the ''IoT endpoint spending by category (millions of dollars)'' [7] . It is also predicted that, by 2020, ''the hardware spending from both segments may extend to about $3 trillion'' [7] .
Das et al. [1] provided a taxonomy of various security protocols that are essential for securing an IoT environment. They mainly concentrate on the following security aspects related to IoT environment: key management [8] - [14] ; user/device authentication [15] - [30] ; device access control [31] - [33] ; user access control [34] - [36] ; privacy preservation [37] - [39] ; and identity management [40] , [41] . The details of these security mechanisms are given in [1] .
In the IoT environment, some smart devices may be physically captured as discussed in Section I-A2 or their battery may drain out. Therefore, to prolong the lifetime of smart devices in the IoT environment, new smart devices deployment is an important task. The deployed smart devices may not be always assumed to be genuine ones as an adversary may deploy some malicious smart devices in the network. This demands for a ''device access control'' mechanism to prevent malicious devices from entering the IoT network. We consider a device access control mechanism in IoT consisting of the following two tasks [1] :
In addition, a new smart device addition phase is essential for access control process in the IoT network.
In this article, we concentrate on the device access control mechanism, which is treated as one of the most important security protocols that is very much essential for securing IoT environment [1] . We propose a novel certificate-based device access control scheme, which is efficient in computation as well as communication, and also provides better ''security & functionality features'' that are essential for device access control, as compared to existing related device access control protocols.
A. SYSTEM MODELS
In this section, we discuss the following models related to our access control scheme in IoT.
1) NETWORK MODEL
We consider the network model for IoT environment as shown in Figure 1 . For a particular application, say healthcare [5] or Industrial IoT (IIoT) [2] , [42] , several IoT smart devices are placed in a deployment area, called the ''target field''. The gateway node (GWN ) can be placed at the corner or at the center of the target field depending on the application scenario. The smart devices will communicate with their neighbor devices. The information gathered by the smart devices need to be sent to the GWN for further processing or decisions. The smart devices close to the GWN will directly communicate with the GWN . Since the communication between the devices and also between the GWN and devices is done typically through wireless medium, there are possibility of having potential attacks performed by an adversary. For secure communications among the communicating entities in the IoT environment, a ''device access control'' plays a very important role where the neighboring devices will authentication each other (via device authentication) followed by secret key establishment among them if the device authentication is made successful. Thus, the information collected at the GWN securely from the smart devices can be also stored in the cloud server(s) so that other users can use those information too.
2) ATTACK MODEL
The broadly-used ''Dolev-Yao threat model (also known as the DY model)'' [43] is applied in the proposed scheme, LACKA-IoT. The entities involved in the IoT environment can communicate among each other using a public channel under the DY model in which the end-point entities (e.g., smart devices) are not treated as trusted entities.
We also adopt the ''current de facto standard model in modeling key-exchange protocols, called the CK-adversary model [44] , [45] '' in the proposed LACKA-IoT. In the CK-adversary model, ''an adversary A can not only deliver data as in the DY model, but he/she can compromise the secret credentials (e.g., session keys, private keys and also session state)''. Thus, even if ''some forms of secret credentials are somehow known to A, there should have a minimum possible consequence on the security of other secret credentials of the communicating participants [46] ''.
In some applications, the smart devices can be deployed in ''an unattended or hostile environment where monitoring 24 × 7 of the deployed devices is not possible'', and hence, there is a chance of physical device capture attack by the adversary A. Therefore, ''the secret credentials stored in the captured smart device(s) can be easily extracted by A with the sophisticated power analysis attacks as explained in [47] , [48] , and A can use those extracted information to deploy fake smart devices in the network''. Finally, it is assumed that both the certification authority (CA) and the GWN are trusted and these will not be compromised by A. The CA is the only trusted authority that can issue the valid certificates for the devices and the GWN .
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The ''main research contributions'' made in this article are as follows.
• A novel certificate-based device access control scheme for the IoT environment has been designed, called ''lightweight access control and key agreement protocol in IoT environment (LACKA-IoT)''. The certificates for the smart devices and the GWN are issued by the trusted CA only. LACKA-IoT is lightweight as it relies on ECC and ''collision-resistant one-way hash function''. Most importantly, LACKA-IoT does not involve the GWN for device access control phase between two neighbor smart devices in the IoT environment.
• A detailed security analysis on LACKA-IoT has been carried out which includes ''formal security analysis using the widely-accepted ROR model [49] , informal (non-mathematical) security analysis and also formal security verification based on the broadly-applied software verification tool, known as AVISPA tool [50] '' to assure that LACKA-IoT can be made highly secure against various potential attacks needed for an access control scheme in IoT environment.
• A detailed ''comparative study on the parameters, such as communication and computation costs, and security & functionality attributes has been performed on LACKA-IoT and other existing most relevant schemes in the literature, and this study shows that LACKA-IoT has a better trade-off among the considered parameters as compared to those for other schemes in the context of IoT''.
• Finally, the practical demonstration has been also carried out on LACKA-IoT for the important network performance parameters.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The layout of this article is as follows. The related work on the access control mechanism related to IoT and its closed fields is provided in Section II. The detailed description of the proposed scheme (LACKA-IoT) is given in Section III. The formal & informal security analysis of LACKA-IoT is discussed in Section IV, while the ''formal security verification of LACKA-IoT using AVISPA tool'' is illustrated in Section V. Section VI gives a detailed comparative analysis of LACKA-IoT and other schemes. NS2-based simulation for LACKA-IoT is provided in Section VII for practical demonstration purpose, while the concluding remarks are drawn in the final section (Section VIII).
II. RELATED WORK
In the following, we briefly review device access control mechanisms in the IoT environment.
Jang et al. [28] proposed an efficient device authentication scheme which works without involvement of a central authority. Their scheme is based on the ''Merkle hash-tree'' in order to achieve authentication.
Sharaf-Dabbagh and Saad [29] designed an ''authentication scheme for the IoT environment''. In their scheme, the IoT smart devices use ''fingerprinting mechanisms along with the transfer learning method''. Their scheme is able to handle ''emulation attacks effectively by differentiating normal changes in the fingerprints due to the environment from the changes done by an attacker''.
Sciancalepore et al. [30] designed a ''device authentication and key management scheme''. Their scheme is based on the ''implicit certificates with the ECC Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol''. Their scheme provides ''replay attack protection'', ''fast re-keying'' and ''robust key negotiation''.
Li et al. [31] designed an access control mechanism for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in the context of the IoT environment by applying their proposed ''heterogeneous signcryption scheme (CI-HSC) that permits a sender in the certificateless cryptography (CLC) environment to send a message to a receiver in the identity-based cryptography (IBC) environment''. Their mechanism relies on the ''identity-based access control (IBAC)'' model. In addition, their scheme uses bilinear pairing operations. Their scheme is then costly in terms of computation overheads due to utilization of IBC and bilinear pairing operations. Furthermore, in this scheme, the GWN involves in the access control mechanism between two IoT smart devices.
Braeken et al. [32] presented ''an efficient and distributed authentication protocol (eDAAAS) in order to access endnodes in an IoT setting for smart homes, authorized by the home owner''. eDAAAS is based on ''symmetric cryptosystem'' and ''one-way cryptographic hash function''. Though eDAAAS achieves very low computation cost, its communication cost is high. Moreover, in eDAAAS, the GWN involves in the access control mechanism between two IoT smart devices.
Luo et al. [33] proposed ''an efficient access control protocol for WSNs in the cross-domain context of the IoT that permits an Internet user in a CLC environment to communicate with a smart device in an IBC environment with different system parameters''. Their scheme is then costly in terms of computation overheads due to utilization of IBC and bilinear pairing operations. In addition, this scheme needs involvement of the GWN in the access control mechanism between two devices. Moreover, all the schemes [31] - [33] are vulnerable to the session key security under the ''current de facto CK-adversary model [44] , [45] (discussed in the attack model in Section I-A2)''.
III. THE PROPOSED DEVICE ACCESS CONTROL AND KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, we present an efficient protocol for device access control and key agreement, called LACKA-IoT, in the IoT environment. LACKA-IoT is lightweight as it utilizes ''ECC primitives and one-way cryptpographic hash function''. To ensure resilience against replay attacks, current timestamps are utilized in LACKA-IoT. Thus, the clocks of all involved entities are assumed to be synchronized. This is a typical assumption in the literature, such as the schemes presented in [2] , [4] , [51] - [53] . Furthermore, the notations with their significance tabulated in Table 2 are utilized in describing as well as analyzing LACKA-IoT.
LACKA-IoT contains the following phases:
• System setup phase: This phase is executed by the trusted certification authority (CA) for selecting the system parameters.
• Device registration phase: This phase is executed by the CA for registration of an IoT smart device D i belonging to a particular gateway node (GWN ) depending on the IoT applications as shown in Figure 1 . The secret credentials including the certificate are pre-loaded into D i 's memory before it is placed in the IoT environment.
• Device access control phase: This phase is responsible for performing authentication between two neighbor IoT smart devices using the pre-loaded credentials including the certificates. At the end of successful mutual authentication, the devices also establish a secret key between them for their secure communications.
• Dynamic device addition phase: Sometimes some IoT devices may be physically captured by an adversary due to hostile environment in some IoT applications, VOLUME 7, 2019 such as healthcare application where an IoT device may be stolen. There may be other possibility that some IoT devices may drain out their power due to resource limitation of battery. Hence, it is also essential to deploy some new IoT devices in the network to continue the secure services. The detailed descriptions of the above phases are explained in the following subsections.
A. SYSTEM SETUP PHASE
The CA performs the system setup phase using the following steps:
• Step S1. The CA chooses a ''non-singular elliptic curve E p (a, b) over a prime finite field Z p '', where p being a large prime with the condition that 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 (mod p) is met. The CA then selects a base point P of order n over E p (a, b) such that n · P = O, where O is the ''zero point or point at infinity''.
• Step S2. The CA picks its own private key x CA and calculates the corresponding public key Q CA = x CA · P.
Here x CA · P = P + P + · · · + P (x CA times) is known as the ''elliptic curve point multiplication or scalar multiplication''.
• Step S3. The CA also picks a ''collision-resistant oneway cryptographic hash function'', say H (·).
• Step S4. Finally, the system parameters {E p (a, b), p, P, H (·), Q CA } are made public, whereas x CA is considered as the private key that is maintained by the CA only.
B. DEVICE REGISTRATION PHASE
All the IoT smart devices, say D i are registered in offline mode by the CA as follows.
• Step R1. For each smart device D i , the CA picks a unique identity ID i , and a unique private key x i to calculate the corresponding public key Q i = x i · P. The CA also generates a distinct random number l i for each smart device D i and computes the following:
where c i is known as the certificate of D i that is generated by the CA.
• Step R2. The CA then pre-loads 
C. DEVICE ACCESS CONTROL PHASE
In this phase, two neighbor IoT smart devices, say D i and D j will authenticate each other and then establish a secret key among them. The essential steps are as follows.
The device D i first generates current timestamp T i and a random number r i . Further, it computes R i = r i · P and
as signature on r i , and then dispatches the ''authentication request message''
The device D j receives the ''authentication request message'' MSG 1 from the device D i and checks the validity of timestamp T i by using the criteria |T * i − T i | < T , where T * i is receiving time of the message MSG 1 and T is ''maximum transmission delay allowed'' for the message. If it fails, the phase is immediately terminated by D j . Otherwise, D j calculates
If it is true, it is confirmed that the certificate c i is issued by the CA genuinely for device D i . D j further calculates
and checks if W j = z i · P. If the signature is valid, it is confirmed that the signature was genuinely generated by D i . After that D j generates a random number r j and current timestamp T j to compute the following:
the session key shared with D i as
and its verifier as
The device D i receives the ''authentication reply message'' MSG 2 from the device D j and checks the validity of timestamp T j by applying the criteria |T * j − T j | < T , where T * j is receiving time of the message MSG 2 . If it fails, the phase is immediately terminated by D i . Otherwise, D i calculates
If it is true, it is confirmed that certificate c j is genuine and it was issued by the CA only. D i then calculates
and checks if W i = z j · P. If it is true, it is also confirmed that signature z j is generated by D j only. In addition, the session key as Figure 2 .
Remark 1: In order to create secret keys between the smart devices D i and its nearby gateway node (GWN ), the CA needs to pick a unique identity ID gwn , and a unique private key x gwn for calculating the corresponding public key Q gwn = x gwn · P for the GWN . Next, the CA needs to generate a distinct random number l gwn for the GWN to compute the following:
where c gwn is the certificate of GWN generated by the CA. Then, the CA will store the credentials {ID gwn , x gwn , A gwn , c gwn , Q gwn } in the GWN 's database and declares Q gwn as public. The public system parameters {E p (a, b), p, P, H (·), Q CA } are also accessible to the GWN . For authenticating and establishing secret key between a smart device D i and its nearby gateway node GWN , they will follow the access control phase described in Section III-C. in the IoT environment, it will then start authentication with its neighbor smart devices and establish secret keys with them using its own pre-loaded credentials including the certificate with the help of the ''device access control phase described in Section III-C''.
This phase is also summarized in Figure 3 .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section covers both formal and informal security analysis on the proposed LACKA-IoT. We define the ''collisionresistant cryptographic one-way hash function'' and ''Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDDHP)'' as follows.
Definition 1 (Collision-Resistant Cryptographic One-Way Hash Function):
A ''collision-resistant cryptographic oneway hash function'' H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a ''deterministic mathematical function that takes a variable length input string and produces a fixed length output string of n bits''. If Adv HASH (A) (rt) is the ''advantage of an adversary A in finding a hash collision'', we have
where the ''probability of a random event X '' is (a, b) . The ECDDHP is that ''given a quadruple (P, k 1 .P, k 2 .P, k 3 .P), decide whether k 3 = k 1 k 2 or a uniform value, where k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ∈ Z * p and Z * p = {1, 2, . . . , p − 1}''. The ECDDHP becomes ''computationally infeasible'' when p is chosen large. For intractability of ECDDHP, p should be chosen at least 160-bit prime.
A. ROR-MODEL BASED FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
We apply the ''widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model'' [49] to prove its semantic security. Through the ROR model, we prove that the proposed LACKA-IoT achieves the ''session key security (SK-security)''. For this purpose, we briefly discuss the ROR model and then prove the SK-security in Theorem 1.
Under the ROR model, an adversary A interconnects with the t th instance of an executing entity (participant), say P t . In the proposed LACKA-IoT, the device D i or D j can be treated as P t . Assume that P Table 3 . Furthermore, a ''collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash function H (·) is modeled as a random oracle, say Hash'', which is also accessible by all the participants including the adversary A.
In the following, we prove that the proposed LACKA-IoT achieves the SK-security. 
Proof 1:
The proof of this theorem is similar to that as presented in other schemes [2] , [4] , [52] . We consider the following three games, say G j , j ∈ [0, 2], where Succ G j A will represent as ''the success probability of an event wherein A can guess the random bit c in the G j correctly''. We then denote ''advantage of A in winning the game G j by Adv
The details of the games G j , j ∈ [0, 2] are outlined below.
• Game G 0 : This is the ''real attack executed by A against our proposed LACKA-IoT in the ROR model'' corresponding to the game G 0 . The bit c is picked randomly at the beginning of the G 0 . Hence, the following result is followed:
• Game G 1 : This game corresponds to ''an eavesdropping attack'' in which A can intercept all the communicated messages
T i } during the access control phase (Section III-C) using the Execute query mentioned in 
• Game G 2 : In this game, the simulation of the Hash query is included so that it can be modeled as ''an active attack''. In the message MSG 1 , the terms z i and c i are safeguarded by the ''collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash function H (·) (see Definition 1)''. In the message MSG 2 , the terms c j , z j and SKV ij are protected by H (·). In the message MSG 3 , the term SKV ij is also protected by H (·). Again, from the intercepted R i = r i .P and R j = r j .P, it is ''computationally infeasible problem'' for the adversary A to derive B ij = B ij = (r i r j ).P due to intractability of ECDDHP (see Definition 2). In a similar way, from the intercepted Q i = x i .P and Q j = x j .P, it is also ''computationally infeasible problem'' for 
All the queries are now simulated by A and it is ''only left with guessing the bit c in order to win the game once the Reveal query along with Test query are executed''. It follows that
Eqs. (1) and (2) give 1 2 .Adv
Further, Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) lead to the following result:
Finally, multiplying both sides of Eq. (6) by a factor of 2, we arrive to the required result:
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS
This section shows how the proposed LACKA-IoT can resist other known attacks that are needed for securing IoT environment through access control mechanism. Proposition 1: LACKA-IoT is secure against the replay attack.
Proof 2: During the access control phase (Section III-C), all the exchanged messages MSG 1 
SKV ij , Q j } and MSG 3 = {SKV ij , T i } involve the random numbers and current timestamps. The validation of the received timestamps T i , T j and T i by the respective communicating parties assures whether the messages are fresh or old ones. Since T is usually small, the probability of replaying the same messages MSG 1 , MSG 2 and MSG 3 within the period T by an adversary is negligible. Thus, the ''replay attack protection'' is achieved in LACKA-IoT.
Proposition 2: LACKA-IoT is secure against the man-inthe-middle attack.
Proof 3: Suppose an adversary A intercepts the mes- Proof 5: Suppose an adversary A wants to deploy a fake (malicious) smart device D f in the existing IoT network so that D f can establish secret keys with its neighbor devices and send fake information. For this purpose, suppose A picks a fake identity ID f and a private key x f to calculate its corresponding public key Q f = x f .P. A can then generate a random number l f to calculate A f = (x f + l f ).P. However, A will not be able to compute the certificate for D f on behalf of the CA of the form c f = x CA + (x f +l f )H (ID f ||A f ) because the private key x CA is only known to the CA. This means that the deployment of D f with fake information {ID f , x f , A f , c f } is not possible by A. Hence, LACKA-IoT is secure against the ''malicious device deployment attack''.
Proposition 5: LACKA-IoT is resilient against the device physical capture attack.
Proof 6: We assume that n d smart devices are physically captured by an adversary A as the devices are placed in ''unattended/hostile environment'' in some IoT applications (e.g., healthcare and military). Therefore, once a device, say D i is captured, A can easily extract all the credentials 
. This session key is dependent on both the ''session-temporary (ephemeral or short term) secrets'' r i and r j , and the long-term secrets x i and x j . The following two cases are considered here:
• Case I: Even if the short term secrets r i and r j are revealed through compromise of session states according to the CK-adversary model discussed in the attack model (Section I-A2) to an adversary A, it is ''computationally difficult task to compute the secret key SK ij without having the long-term secrets x i and x j ''. • Case II: Even if the long term secrets x i and x j are somehow known to A, it is also ''computationally difficult task to compute the secret key SK ij without having the short-term secrets r i and r j ''.
Therefore, it is clear from the above two cases that the session key SK ij is only computed if A compromises both short & long term secrets. Since the secret keys between any two devices are distinct, ''a secret key leakage to A in a session does not lead to derivation of other secret keys in other sessions and it is computationally infeasible task due to utilization of both short & long term secrets in construction of secret keys''. Furthermore, due to intractability of ECDDHP, it is ''computationally infeasible task for A to derive K ij = (x i x j ).P from the intercepted Q i and Q j for constructing the secret key SK ij ''. Hence, the ''session-temporary information attack is protected in LACKA-IoT, and as a result, LACKA-IoT also preserves perfect forward secrecy''. Thus, LACKA-IoT is secure against ''ESL attack''.
V. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION THROUGH AVISPA TOOL
In this section, we first briefly discuss the ''widely-accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [50] and its implementation details of the proposed device access control and key agreement scheme (LACKA-IoT) using the High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [54] ''. Next, the analysis of simulation results using AVISPA is discussed. AVISPA is treated as a ''push-button tool for the automated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications, which provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying protocols and their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques [50] ''. Figure 4 illustrates the architecture of AVISPA.
HLPSL is applied to implement a security protocol to check if the designed protocol is safe or unsafe. In AVISPA, there are four backends, which are listed below [50] :
• The first backend is ''On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) that does several symbolic techniques to explore the state space in a demand-driven way''.
• The second backend is known as the ''CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher) that provides a translation from any security protocol specification written as transition relation in intermediate format into a set of constraints which are effectively used to find whether there are attacks on protocols''.
• The third backend is called the ''SAT-based ModelChecker (SATMC) that builds a propositional formula which is then fed to a state-of-the-art SAT solver and any model found is translated back into an attack''.
• The fourth backend is the ''TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols) that approximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages''.
The HLPSL code is first transferred into the ''Intermediate Format (IF)'' which is then given as input to one of the four backends. The IF then produces the ''Output Format (OF)''. The OF has the important characteristics: ''when the analysis of a security protocol has been successful (by finding an attack or not), the OF describes precisely what is the result, and under what conditions it has been VOLUME 7, 2019 obtained [50] ''. The OF has various sections as described below [50] .
• SUMMARY: It mentions ''whether the tested protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is inconclusive''.
• DETAILS: It tells ''a detailed explanation of why the tested protocol is concluded as safe, or under what conditions the test application or protocol is exploitable using an attack, or why the analysis is inconclusive''.
• PROTOCOL: This defines the ''HLPSL specification of the target protocol in IF''.
• GOAL: It is ''the goal of the analysis which is being performed by AVISPA using HLPSL specification''.
• BACKEND: It provides ''the name of the back-end that is used for the analysis, that is, one of OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC and TA4SP''.
• Final section includes ''the trace of a possible vulnerability to the target protocol, if any, along with some useful statistics and relevant comments''. More details about AVISPA and its HLPSL implementation can be found in [50] .
In our implementation of LACKA-IoT, we have three basic and two composition roles. The basic roles represent various participants in the protocol (the roles for the smart device D i , smart device D j and CA). The composition roles (session and goal & environment) are the mandatory roles that include various scenarios involving basic roles.
Three types of verification were done for the proposed LACKA-IoT: 1) ''executability checking on non-trivial HLPSL specifications''; 2) ''replay attack checking''; and 3) ''Dolev-Yao model checking using the DY model discussed in the attack model in Section I-A2''. The executability check ensures that ''the protocol will reach to a state where a possible attack can happen, during the run of the protocol''. The proposed LACKA-IoT was simulated for the ''execution tests and a bounded number of sessions model checking''. To check the ''replay attack on the proposed protocol (LACKA-IoT)'', the OFMC backend tests if ''the legitimate agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder''. This back-end then supplies ''the intruder (i) about the knowledge of some normal sessions between the valid agents''. OFMC backend also checks ''if any man-in-the-middle attack is possible by i for the Dolev-Yao model checking''.
We have used the broadly accepted ''SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA)'' tool [55] in order to perform the formal security verification part through simulation study on our proposed LACKA-IoT. The simulation results under the broadly-used OFMC backend shown in Figure 5 ensure that LACKA-IoT protects both replay & man-in-the-middle attacks.
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed LACKA-IoT with the relevant recent schemes, such as the schemes proposed by Luo et al. [33] , Li et al. [31] and Braeken et al. [32] with respect to the following parameters: 1) ''communication costs'', 2) ''computation costs'', and 3) ''security & functionality attributes''.
A. COMMUNICATION COSTS COMPARISON
For ''comparison of communication costs among the proposed LACKA-IoT and other schemes'', it is assumed that an identity is 160 bits, a random number is 160 bits, hash output (if SHA-1 hashing algorithm [56] is applied) is 160 bits and timestamp is 32 bits. It is assumed that an elliptic curve point of the form P = (P x , P y ), with P x and P y denoting the x and y co-ordinates, respectively, is (160 +160) = 320 bits as ''160-bit ECC security remains same as that for an 1024-bit RSA public key cryptosystem [57] ''. Furthermore, it is assumed that a message size is 1024 bits.
In the proposed LACKA-IoT, the three messages Table 4 tabulates the ''comparative study on communication costs'' for the proposed LACKA-IoT and other schemes. The total communication costs needed for the schemes of Luo et al. [33] , Li et al. [31] and Braeken et al. [32] are 3040 bits, 3488 bits and 3552 bits, respectively. LACKA-IoT demands less communication cost as compared to other schemes [31] , [32] . Though the scheme [33] requires less communication cost as compared to LACKA-IoT, it fails to preserve or support several ''security and functionality attributes'' as mentioned in Table 6 while those are compared with LACKA-IoT. 
B. COMPUTATION COSTS COMPARISON
To evaluate the ''computation costs comparison among the proposed LACKA-IoT and other schemes'', the following symbols are used: T h to denote the ''time needed to execute a one-way cryptographic hash function'', T ecm to denote the ''time needed to execute an elliptic curve point (scalar) multiplication'', T eca to denote the ''time needed to execute an elliptic curve point addition'', T sed to denote the ''time needed to execute a symmetric encryption/decryption function'', and T me to denote ''time needed to execute a modular exponentiation operation in Z * p ''. During the device access control phase of the proposed LACKA-IoT, the device D i needs 7 T ecm + 3 T eca + 6 T h computation cost, whereas its neighbor device D j also requires 7 T ecm + 3 T eca + 6 T h computation cost. Thus, the average computation cost needed for an IoT smart device for node authentication and also for establishment of secret key with one of its neighbor devices is 7 T ecm + 3 T eca + 6 T h .
To estimate ''rough computation time (in milliseconds)'', we use the experimental results based the user's device in [58] as T ecm ≈ 13.405 ms, T eca ≈ 0.081 ms, T h ≈ 0.056 ms, T bp ≈ 32.713 ms, and T me ≈ 2.249 ms. We also assume that T sed ≈ T h . In the proposed LACKA-IoT, a smart device's computation time becomes 7 T ecm + 3 T eca + 6 T h ≈ 94.414 ms. Table 5 tabulates the ''comparative study on computation costs and also rough estimated time in milliseconds'' for the proposed LACKA-IoT and other schemes. It is noted that LACKA-IoT demands less computation cost as compared with other schemes [31] , [33] . On the other hand, the scheme [32] needs very less computation cost as compared to LACKA-IoT, Luo et al.'s scheme [33] and Li et al.'s scheme [31] . This is primarily because Braeken et al.'s scheme [32] is based on ''symmetric encryption/decryption'' and ''one-way hash function''. However, Braeken et al.'s scheme fails to preserve or support several ''security and functionality attributes'' as mentioned in Table 6 while those are compared with LACKA-IoT.
C. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY ATTRIBUTES COMPARISON
Finally, in Table 6 we tabulate the comparative study on ''functionality & security attributes'' for the proposed LACKA-IoT and other schemes [31] - [33] . It is worth noting that all the compared existing schemes [31] - [33] do not support or preserve the attributes FSA 3 , SFA 8 , SFA 10 and SFA 11 . On the other hand, LACKA-IoT fulfills all the mentioned attributes FSA 1 -FSA 11 . 
VII. PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE: NS2 SIMULATION STUDY
LACKA-IoT is simulated under the widely-used ''networking simulation tool, NS2 2.35 simulator'' [59] on the ''Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS platform''.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
The details of different parameters related to simulation are tabulated in Table 7 . The ''network coverage area'' is taken as an 100 × 150 m 2 area. The ''communication ranges'' of the ''gateway node (GWN )'' and ''IoT smart devices'' are taken as 200 m and 50 m, respectively. Furthermore, the ''network simulation time'' is taken as 1800 seconds or 30 minutes. In addition, we have applied the standard ''Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)'' protocol for the routing purpose.
B. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
The following three cases are taken into account during the simulation of the proposed LACKA-IoT. All the cases consider one GWN . Moreover, the remaining parameters are common in all the cases.
• Case 1. Under this case, five IoT smart devices are deployed.
• Case 2. Under this case, eleven IoT smart devices are deployed. • Case 3. Under this case, seventeen IoT smart devices are deployed. In each of the above cases, the following messages are exchanged between different network entities in LACKA-IoT: 
C. DISCUSSIONS ON SIMULATION RESULTS
The network performance parameters: ''end-to-end delay (in seconds)'', ''throughput (in bps)'' and ''packet loss rate'' are measured and analyzed during the simulation of LACKA-IoT.
1) IMPACT ON END-TO-END DELAY
The ''end-to-end delay (EED)'' is measured as ''the average time taken by the data packets to arrive at the destination from a source''. It can be ''mathematically computed as 
2) IMPACT ON THROUGHPUT
The ''throughput'' is measured as ''the number of bits transmitted per unit time which is computed as (ν r × |δ|)/T d , where T d represents total time (in seconds), |δ| is the size of a packet, and ν r is the total number of received packets''. The simulation time mentioned in the simulation is also taken as the actual total time, that is, 1800 seconds. Fig. 7 provides the details of the ''network throughput (in bps)'' of LACKA-IoT under different simulation cases. The throughput values becomes as 9.49, 16.07 and 22.54 bps for Cases 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The ''throughput'' increases with an increase in the IoT smart devices. Due to the increment in IoT smart devices, ''more number of messages are exchanged in the network'', and as a consequence, the ''network throughput'' also increases.
3) IMPACT ON PACKET LOSS RATE
The ''packet loss rate (plr)'' is also a crucial network performance parameter which is defined by ''the number of packets loss per unit time and it is mathematically formulated as plr = , where T d is the total time (in seconds) and ν lp the total number of lost packets''. For a dependable network communication, the plr needs to be kept as less as possible. The plrs of LACKA-IoT for different simulation cases are given in Fig. 8 . It is also noted that the ''considered simulation time is 1800 seconds, which is the total time''. The plr values of LACKA-IoT are 0.00056, 0.00056 and 0.00389 for Cases 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The plr increases when we add more number of IoT smart devices in the network, because with an increase of IoT smart devices, more messages are also interchanged. It further reflects in congestion, and as a consequence, the plr also rises in Case 3.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we attempted to design a novel device access control mechanism, called LACKA-IoT, in the IoT environment. LACKA-IoT is lightweight scheme as it utilizes ''ECC and one-way cryptographic hash function''. In LACKA-IoT, through the ''device authentication process'' any two neighbor smart devices first authenticate each other using their pre-loaded certificates and other secret credentials, while the ''key agreement process'' allows those authenticated devices to construct secret key among them for secure data communication. LACKA-IoT is shown to be highly secure through a detailed security analysis using ''formal security under the widely-accepted ROR model, informal security analysis and also formal security verification under the broadly-applied AVISPA software verification tool''. A detailed comparative analysis of LACKA-IoT and other schemes (see reveals that LACKA-IoT has a better trade-off among the considered parameters (communication and computation costs, and security & functionality attributes) as compared to those for other schemes in the context of IoT. The ''practical demonstration using NS2 simulation'' on LACKA-IoT is also carried out on the ''network performance parameters (end-to-end delay, throughput and packet loss rate)'', which are shown in Figures 6-8 .
In the future, we target to evaluate LACKA-IoT in a real-world environment. It will allow us to fine-tune LACKA-IoT, if necessary, to offer better security and performance in a real-world deployment including device anonymity and untraceability preservation properties.
